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In Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 559 U.S. 175 (2010),
the Supreme Court held that a service station franchisee pursuing a claim of
constructive termination against the franchisor must, under the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1978), abandon the
franchise. This decision makes the doctrine of constructive termination the
functional equivalent of actual termination for these types of franchises.
Actual termination usually involves catastrophic injuries to franchisees,
which can destroy their economic and business livelihood. In a society so
dependent upon the franchise system of business, this imposes secondary
harms on the American economy.
Related fields of American law and other nations’ franchise law,
specifically that of France, show that a more refined view of constructive
termination—embracing the franchisees’ possible continued operations
under the franchise network’s trademark—presents a fairer, more efficient
standard. This paradigm reflects the particular parties’ expectations and,
more generally, the norms for most franchised enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
Just as the key moments in a flight are the takeoff and the landing, so
for business franchises the key points are their formation and conclusion.
Between these two end points is the franchise relationship, usually intended
to be long-term and renewable.1 Once the parties have entered that
relationship, however, an overarching issue is when and how it may end.
Termination before full completion of the franchise term could be
catastrophic, especially for franchisees heavily invested in a franchised
business network. Indeed, when a franchisee alleges severe mistreatment
by the franchisor, it may consider its situation to be on par with that of
actual franchise dissolution and it could allege constructive termination.
In the franchising context, constructive termination is a wrongful
cessation of franchisee rights in which the franchise has not actually been
terminated, but the franchisor’s conduct towards the franchisee constitutes,
in effect, a termination of the franchise.2 In Mac’s Shell Services Inc. v.
Shell Oil Products,3 the Supreme Court evaluated the availability of the
doctrine of constructive termination for franchisees operating businesses
governed by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA). The PMPA
regulates the relationship between oil companies and independent
franchised gas retailers.4 The case arose from the franchisor, Shell Oil,
1. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Part Standard,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 646.
2. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 319 (noting that economic
duress may serve as the basis for a claim of constructive termination); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 380 (10th ed. 2014) (noting that “constructive” means “[l]egally imputed”
and is a “legal fiction” that courts usually grant “for equitable reasons”).
3. Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 559 U.S. 175 (2010).
4. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1978). The Court
tries to toe the line by declaring numerous times that it is not closing the door on
constructive termination claims. See, e.g., Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 187 n.8 (“[W]e do not
decide whether the PMPA contemplates claims for constructive termination . . . .”).
However, throughout Mac’s Shell — and even later in the same sentence of that same
footnote — the Court constructively eviscerates any possibility of constructive termination
claims by dismissing the proposed legal standards. Id. (“[W]e observe that the Court of
Appeals’ unwillingness or inability to establish a more concrete standard underscores the
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assigning its rights under multiple, pre-existing franchise agreements to a
third party.5 The franchisees, Mac’s Shell and additional gas station
owners, brought suit against Shell Oil for a claim of relief under the PMPA
on the ground that the franchisor’s assignment of lease rights constituted
constructive termination.6
However, the Supreme Court unanimously denied the use of
constructive termination for cases involving the PMPA. It held that
allowing franchisees to obtain relief under the doctrine of constructive
termination would ignore the scope of the PMPA.7 The Court articulated
that the PMPA is limited to describing circumstances in which franchisors
may terminate a franchise or decline renewal. The Court stated that to
accept a constructive termination claim before the franchisee has
abandoned its franchise would require courts to articulate a standard for
deciding which act was so serious that it constructively terminated the
franchise, a standard, the Court concluded, that “simply evades coherent
formulation.”8 In effect, the Court decided abandonment is required
because allowing the franchisee to do anything less would produce
untenable, even impalpable, standards.9 The Mac’s Shell decision has had
many pro-franchisor aftereffects in that it limits franchisees’ relief only to
situations where actual termination is found. This provides franchisees that
are faced with wrongful non-renewal of the franchise relationship or Mac’s
Shell-like franchisor conduct with no recourse under the PMPA.
The Court in Mac’s Shell was wrong. This Article describes how the
Court gave franchisors a way out that was never intended under the
PMPA.10 Under the PMPA, Congress only gave franchisors the ability to
deny renewal of a franchise under very specific requirements.11
Franchisors must provide written notice and a specific reason for
termination.12 The PMPA created a specific cause of action for franchisees
that fell victim to improper treatment by franchisors.13 While the PMPA
difficulties and inherent contradictions involved in crafting a standard for finding a
termination when no termination has in fact occurred.”).
5. 559 U.S. at 175.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 176.
8. Id. at 187. In this regard, the Court adopts Shell’s argument. See Reply Brief for
Respondent at 10, Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. 175 (Nos. 08-240 and 08-372) (noting that the
assignment-based theory that courts rely on in allowing constructive termination claims
does not make sense). Such strong language probably hurts any chance of lower courts
looking at Mac’s Shell as particularly narrow or fact-driven.
9. 559 U.S. at 175.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (2006).
11. Id. § 2802(a).
12. Id. § 2802(b).
13. Id. § 2805.
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might not explicitly allow a claim of constructive termination,14 Congress
did not necessarily intend the PMPA to be an all-encompassing, fourcorners-only type of document.15
Congress enacted the PMPA for the purpose of “protect[ing]
franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory termination or non renewal of
their franchisees.”16 The Act was crafted to meet this goal by addressing
three common concerns for franchisees:
(1) that franchisee independence may be undermined by the use
of actual or threatened termination or nonrenewal to compel
compliance with franchisor marketing policies; (2) that gross
disparity of bargaining power may result in franchise agreements
that are or tend to become contracts of adhesion; and (3) that
termination or nonrenewal may disrupt the reasonable
expectation of the parties that the franchise relationship will be a
continuing one.17
This Article opens with an examination of why the Supreme Court’s
proposed solution of requiring abandonment is an economically unsound
choice.18 Next, the Article looks at how other courts handle this issue; it
explores possible solutions from other nations, particularly France.19 The
Article explores how the French courts have authority to police the fairness
of franchise contracts and the effects of contract breaches, and to impose
heightened requirements for termination clause enforcement. Through this
model analysis, the Author demonstrates why the French franchising model
is the preferable approach to these common franchise issues, or at least it
instills a sense of the types of solutions that could remedy our American
system. The Article also explores other “constructive” doctrines in

14. Although curiously, the PMPA’s statute of limitations clause for claims under
§2805(a) would seem to suggest termination might not be necessary to pursue the claim as
the PMPA requires claims to be brought within one year after either “(1) the date of
termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the franchise relationship; or (2) the date the
franchisor fails to comply with the requirements of section 2802 or 2803 of this title.” Id.
§2805(a)(1)-(2).
15. Ann Hurwitz, Franchisor Market Withdrawal: “Good Cause” for Termination?, 7
FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 26 (1987). Congress elected to leave some discretion to the courts. Id.
(“Congress decided to leave to the courts the task of resorting to traditional principles of
equity to maximize attainment of the competing statutory objectives . . . .”); see also 15
U.S.C. § 2805(b) (delineating the parameters of when the courts can use their equitable
powers).
16. Mark J. Burzych & Emily L. Matthews, Selective Enforcement of Franchise
Agreement Terms and System Standards, 23 FRANCHISE L.J. 110, 110 (2003) (quoting
Massey v. Exxon Corp, 942 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1991)).
17. Id.
18. See infra, Part I.
19. See infra, Part II.
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American law and how they compare to constructive termination. Then,
the Article evaluates why constructive termination works, by looking at the
difficulties of proving actual termination,20 where the Mac’s Shell analysis
went adrift.21 Lastly, the Article posits as a conclusion that related fields of
American law, and other nations’ franchise law, show that constructive
termination presents a fairer, more efficient standard reflecting the
particular parties’ expectations and, more generally, the norms for most
franchised enterprises.
I.

TERMINATION AND WHY ABANDONMENT IS NOT THE ANSWER
ECONOMICALLY

To comprehend how the Mac’s Shell reasoning is flawed, one must
start by examining the nature of franchising. In both France and the United
States, franchising is “a business relationship based on contract law in
which a franchised business grants a franchisee the rights to use its
trademarks and proprietary information in exchange for royalties.”22 The
legal requirements for franchises vary between the two countries, as do the
definitions of officially recognized franchise systems.23 However, the types
of franchise systems recognized in both countries are essentially the same,
and parties entering into franchise relationships in either country do so for

20. See infra, Part III-A.
21. See infra, Part III-B.
22. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 779, 780 (2010) [hereinafter, “A Community Standard”]; Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A French Comparison, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 315, 319-22 (2009) [hereinafter, “A French Comparison”].
23. Emerson, A French Comparison, supra note 22, at 320-23, 330-33. The United
States does not have uniform requirements across all 50 states – about 11 states have
specific franchise laws and the others use the Federal Trade Commission’s requirements for
franchises. The FTC defines a franchise as a continuing commercial relationship where the
franchise seller, orally or in writing, promises (1) that the franchisee will have the right to
operate a business identified by the franchisor’s trademark, or to offer, sell, or distribute
goods or services with the franchisor’s trademark; (2) that the franchisor can exert
significant control over the franchisee’s method of operation or provide significant
assistance in the same; (3) and that before commencing operations as a franchisee, the latter
is required to make payment or commit to make a payment to the franchisor. John R.F.
Baer & Susan Grueneberg, United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES
LAWS United States-7 (Andrew P. Loewinger & Michael K. Lindsey eds., 2011). The
French Franchise Federation now defines franchises as requiring (1) a system of marketing
goods, services, or technology, (2) based upon a close, ongoing collaboration, (3) whereby
the franchisor grants to the franchisee the right to conduct business in accordance with the
franchisor’s concept. Emmanuel Schulte, France, in Getting the Deal Through: Franchise
62, 63 (Philip F. Zeidman ed., 2014).
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the same reasons.24 The motivations for franchising include expansion of
capital for the franchisor and a greater chance of business success for the
franchisee, who gets to take advantage of the franchisor’s tested business
plan, training programs, educational programs, and advertising.25
In all business, there is risk. For franchised businesses, a monumental
risk is the termination of the franchise relationship. The prospect may be
small, but the consequences are enormous, and so it is fair to conclude that,
for all franchised systems and for all franchisees, termination is a brooding
omnipresence. The impact of a terminated franchise relationship is also
felt differently by franchisees and franchisors, as franchisors typically have
“deep pockets” and many other franchise relationships. Most franchisees
only operate one franchise.
Every franchise agreement created goes through a life cycle. After the
franchisee fills out a franchise application and all due diligence is
performed, the franchisor may extend an offer, governed by specific terms,
to the franchisee. Upon acceptance of that offer, the franchise contract
commences, and from this birth onward, the parties cannot ignore the
franchise’s potential demise. To do otherwise, is to ignore the proverbial
800-pound gorilla in the room: that the ultimate enforcement weapon in
any franchisor’s hands is the ability to terminate a franchise.26 Throughout
the term of a franchise, the overarching issue remains when, and for what,
the franchisor may bring the franchise contract to an early conclusion.
Conversely, when may a franchisor’s treatment of the franchisee, as if the
latter were no longer a member of the franchisor’s network, give the
franchisee the right to consider himself a terminated, former franchisee that
is entitled to the same damage awards or other relief as if it were actually,
typically expressly, terminated?
Unfortunately, Mac’s Shell provides no concrete answer to the
practical problems of a real, albeit constructive, termination and instead
leaves the analysis buried in a jumble of jargon about “abandonment.” The
case arose from a franchise arrangement, where the franchisee, Mac’s Shell
Service, was required to pay Shell Oil Company monthly rent for use of the
premises where it operated its service station. Shell offered its franchisees,
including Plaintiff, a rent subsidy, which reduced the monthly rent owed by
a set amount for every gallon of motor fuel a franchisee sold above a

24. Emerson, A French Comparison, supra note 22, at 330.
25. Id.
26. Such an enforcement mechanism is necessary so that the franchisor can better
control the quality of the franchised product or service and maximize revenues for the
franchisee and itself. W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 10:50 (2013); Jonathan Klick et al., Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation
of Franchise Termination, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 355, 359 (2009).
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certain predetermined quantity. This subsidy arrangement was renewed on
a yearly basis, until Shell’s predecessor did not renew the rent subsidy
arrangement with Mac’s Shell. Mac’s Shell brought suit, alleging that the
discontinuation of the rent subsidy constituted a constructive termination of
the franchise relationship.
While this seemed to be a strong argument for constructive
termination, the Court barred the application of this doctrine to any PMPArelated lawsuits and issued an opinion that fell short. The Court’s analysis
fails to address the flaws of compelling actual abandonment,27 as discussed
in newsletters and other popular media devoted to franchising.28 These
flaws have been described by scholars as the “loss of significant
relationship-specific investments, lack of available attractive alternatives,
significant switching costs, and . . . a severe legal risk that the franchisee
will not be able to recover damages for the aforementioned abandonment
losses under a constructive termination claim.”29
Even though the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge or weigh the
merits of the arguments, the Court of Appeals did evaluate the issues that
arise when requiring actual abandonment before Mac’s Shell went to the
Supreme Court.30 When faced with actions that would ordinarily amount to
constructive termination, which cannot be claimed as such under the PMPA
because of Mac’s Shell, a franchisee may attempt to salvage whatever
fragmented franchise relationship still exists as an effort to save their
business costs and years of work. This effort is usually a waste because the
new terms the franchisees are forced to operate under are materially
different from those upon which they established their franchise system,
and they are usually designed to force the franchisee out of the relationship.
New terms typically force franchisees out either by forcing them to
terminate the relationship themselves or to violate the franchise agreement
so that the franchisor can claim a breach of contract. Franchisee-plaintiffs
in Marcoux described the hardships they endured as going into personal

27. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 2 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “abandonment”).
28. See W. Michael Garner, Fraud, Breach and Wrongful Termination, BLUE
MAUMAU
(Oct.
13,
2010,
4:49
PM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/fraud_breach_and_wrongful_termination,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/V7JY-K4AT (“[F]ranchisees should not have to wait until the end of the
relationship to defend themselves from predatory practices by a franchisor.”).
29. See Uri Benoliel, Rethinking the U.S. Supreme Court’s Abandonment Requirement
in Mac’s Shell Service Inc. v. Shell Oil Products, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 78 (2011) (discussing
the exceptionally high costs of franchise abandonment).
30. See generally Marcoux v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 524 F.3d 33, 46 (1st Cir. 2008)
(holding that “[t]o require an actual abandonment of years of work and investment
before . . . recogniz[ing] a right of action [for constructive termination] . . . would be
unreasonable.”).

ARTICLE 4 (EMERSON) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/7/16 2:54 PM

170

[Vol. 18:1

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

debt, filing for bankruptcy, et cetera.31 The Court noted that these
outcomes frustrate the congressional plan for the PMPA by requiring a
franchisee to go out of business before the PMPA can provide franchisee
protection.32
Ultimately, requiring abandonment before allowing claims of
constructive termination fails because it effectively strips the constructive
termination doctrine of its very nature and purpose and calls into question
whether “constructive” acts can even occur.33 These “constructive” acts are
supposed to be what separates the doctrine of constructive termination from
actual termination, but Mac’s Shell obliterated that differentiation. In
Mac’s Shell, the Supreme Court severely underestimated the abandonment
costs for franchisees.34 For starters, the lump sum fee that franchisees pay
upfront is often hefty.35 In addition, starting a franchise requires many
investments specific to the venture, leaving franchisees contemplating
abandonment to consider the large loss which abandonment would
require.36 These investments – known as idiosyncratic investments – hold
little to no value if a franchisor-franchisee relationship goes sour, as these

31. Id.
32. Id. See also Pro Sales, Inc. v. Texaco, U.S.A., 792 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the policy rationales underlying the PMPA).
33. High abandonment costs make the Supreme Court’s requirement of abandonment
before recovery for constructive termination unreasonable and problematic. See generally
Benoliel, supra note 29, at 77 (discussing how franchisee abandonment costs “include loss
of significant relationship-specific investments, lack of available attractive alternatives,
significant switching costs, and severe legal uncertainty.”).
34. “[I]nstead of closing its doors, a franchisee might feel compelled to sell the
business at a loss to mitigate its damages.” Carmen D. Caruso, Franchisee Claims for
Constructive Termination Under the PMPA After Mac’s Shell, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 139, 141
(2011); see also Benoliel, supra note 29, at 78 (questioning the Court’s assumption
regarding franchisee abandonment costs).
35. New Burger King franchisees must pay $50,000, while McDonalds and KFC
franchisees must pay $45,000. See New Franchisee FAQ’s, BURGER KING CORP.,
http://www.bk.com/franchising/FAQ (last visited Nov 22, 2015), achieved at
http://perma.cc/5SRJ-JE5Q; McDonald’s Franchise Information, ENTREPRENEUR,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/mcdonalds/282570-0.html (last visited Dec. 2,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/R2SD-3FCA; KFC Corp. Franchise Information,
ENTREPRENEUR,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/kfccorp/282495-0.html
(last
visited Nov. 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H24L-2REJ. Abandonment of the
franchisee-franchisor relationship results in a forfeiture of this fee. Benoliel, supra note 29,
at 87 (citing Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 359 (1980); Warren S. Grimes, Market Definition in
Franchise Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the Franchisor’s Conflict of
Interest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243, 250 (1999); Warren S. Grimes, Making Sense of State Oil
Co. v. Khan: Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Under a Rule of Reason, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
567, 586 (1997)).
36. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 83.
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investments typically have a specific nature tailored to the individual
franchise.37
One example of such an investment is property improvements.
Franchisees often have to make improvements to their location, including
walls, doors, cabinets, light fixtures, and floor coverings that are required to
be common to the franchise’s image.38 Potential franchisees face large
investments in property improvements – at least $100,000 for a Subway
franchise,39 or $175,000 for a Jimmy John’s franchise.40 Businessmen
interested in potentially opening a Subway franchise could face anywhere
from $59,000 to more than $134,000 in leasehold improvements.
Continual use of a franchise system’s “shop setup” after the franchise
termination may even lead to a copyright infringement lawsuit; the legal
fees will be extensive whether or not the claim is actually valid. The crux
for franchisees, however, stems from the fact that franchisees usually are
forced to rent the property from the franchisor, like the Plaintiff was
required to do in Mac’s Shell.41 Thus, franchisees face a large sunk cost for
improvements to property they do not own. Even worse, this setup gives
the franchisor additional leverage, as franchisees try to ensure they are not
found to have abandoned the enterprise.42 Franchisees are also generally
prohibited from selling property improvements to a third party, such that
they will see no financial recovery for their improvements.43
Another cost unlikely to be recovered after abandonment is the time
and money spent on training. Measuring these efforts quantitatively is
difficult and does not factor into any damages reward. Most franchisees
will have to attend training held by the franchisor.44 The training is not
short either: new McDonald’s franchisees will often train for more than two
years and spend 2,000 hours in another McDonald’s learning the ropes,
completely on the new franchisee’s dime.45 In addition, training is often
37. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 83.
38. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 83.
39. Subway
Franchise
Information,
FRANCHISE
DIRECT,
http://www.franchisedirect.com/directory/subway/915/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/Z2L8-7MJM.
40. Jimmy
John’s
Franchise
Cost
and
Fees,
FRANCHISE
DIRECT,
http://www.franchisedirect.com/directory/jimmyjohns/ufoc/5713/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JMZ4-26KK.
41. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 79-80.
42. Abandonment or even failing to meet every one of the franchisor’s terms could
lead to eviction from the property. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 80.
43. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 84.
44. Emerson, supra note 1, at 652; Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations:
Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 941 (1990).
45. See Benoliel, supra note 29, at 84-85 (“McDonald’s total training generally takes
over two years to complete, with the franchisee working approximately 2,000
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very specific to the franchisor’s business type, which makes the skills
learned in training nontransferable upon franchise termination.46
The majority of franchising duties still tend to fall upon the franchisee.
As mentioned above, the franchisee must pay the franchisor the initial
franchising fee, plus a percentage of revenues, as a pre-requisite to even
using the franchising system and trademark goodwill.47 Even when the
franchisee is given such usage rights, the franchisee is restricted in the
types of uses allowed with the trademark. Then, these uses are even further
limited by the requirements of franchisee compliance with operations
manuals and system-wide standards. The franchisee’s failure to comply
may result in a default on the franchise contract, which brings into play the
risk of termination. Thus, the franchisee’s continuous self-monitoring
increases the contribution that the franchisee makes to the franchise
relationship.
Certainly, the potential financial losses leave franchisees skittish about
abandonment, which according to Mac’s Shell is necessary for pursuing a
constructive termination claim. Multiple statistical studies confirm this
fear. Robert Ping conducted a survey of U.S. hardware retailers by mailing
a questionnaire to a group selected from the subscription list of a wellknown publication within the industry.48 The survey’s respondents showed
that high exiting costs — similar to franchisees facing losses due to
abandonment — play a large role in convincing franchisees to continue the

uncompensated hours in a McDonald’s restaurant.”) (citing Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine
Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald’s Franchisees,
37 J.L. & ECON. 417, 426 (1994); D. L. Noren, The Economics of the Golden Arches: A
Case Study of the McDonald’s System, 34 THE AM. ECONOMIST 60, 60 (1990)).
46. New KFC franchisees learn how to run a KFC restaurant: preparing the food, how
to fix the equipment and how to train employees. See Benoliel, supra note 29, at 85 (“For
example, the KFC franchise provides a course covering the specific basic skills necessary to
operate a KFC restaurant, including product preparation, equipment maintenance, inventory
control, and personnel training.”) (citing Robert T. Justis & Peng S. Chan, Training for
Franchise Management, 29 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 87, 90 (1991); James A. Brickley et al.,
Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising, 49 J.L. ECON. 173, 177 (2006)).
47. The franchisee is responsible for most of the duties arising out of a standard form
franchise agreement. See Jennifer Dolman, There’s No Cure for Breaking the Trust in Your
Franchise
Agreement,
FINANCIAL
POST
(Sept.
9,
2013,
4:21
PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/09/09/theres-no-cure-for-breaking-the-trust-in-yourfranchise-agreement/, archived at http://perma.cc/U4H4-W6BB (“In consideration for the
use of the franchisor’s system, goodwill, reputation and brand, a franchisee usually pays the
franchisor an initial fee plus a percentage of gross revenues toward royalty and advertising
fees. Further, the franchisee is restricted in its use of the franchisor’s trademarks, and must
comply with its confidential operating manual.”).
48. Robert A. Ping Jr., Unexplored Antecedents of Exiting in a Marketing Channel, 75
J. RETAILING 218, 227 (1999).
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relationship even when they are unsatisfied.49 Another Ping survey of U.S.
retailers showed that hardware retailers who have few alternative options
are even less likely to abandon relationships with their suppliers.50 Indeed,
even if a franchise’s exit costs are not as high as Ping and others conclude
that they are, these costs are dynamic. That is, they are subject to variation
over time. This highly changeable state actually should make a judge’s
ability to monitor the franchise system and the terminations within that
system - the French, more active overview - more efficient and fair than the
restrained, even distant failure to oversee often found in the American
system.
Unless the franchisee contracts otherwise, the franchise agreement is
typically terminated when property is sold. Because the franchise does not
follow the property, a franchisee may not sell the brand to someone else,
but rather the buyer must then contract for a new franchise agreement with
the franchisor in order to become a franchisee and gain the right to use the
franchise brand. This often arises in the hotel franchising industry and
further limits alternatives for a franchisee that is dissatisfied with his or her
franchise agreement.51 Finally, Professors Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern
surveyed suppliers and dealers of consumer durables.52
The 626
questionnaires showed that as a dealer becomes more economically
dependent on its supplier, the dealer is less likely to abandon the
relationship, even after destructive acts by a franchisor.53

49. See id. at 234 (“In addition, cost-of-exit increased loyal behavior at lower levels of
satisfaction . . . .”).
50. See Benoliel, supra note 29, at 92 (“The analysis of 288 questionnaires shows that
lack of available attractive alternatives for hardware retailers is negatively associated with
their propensity to abandon their relationships with their suppliers in the face of relationship
problems.”) (citing Robert A. Ping Jr., The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints
on Retailer Exiting, Voice, Loyalty, Opportunism, and Neglect, 69 J. RETAILING 320, 327,
329, 340 (1993)).
51. See Robert E. Braun & Catherine D. Holmes, Brand Franchise Issues in Hotel
Purchase
and
Sale
Transactions,
LEXOLOGY
(Aug.
1,
2012)
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e9dca86d-7ecc-4d00-a5d7-b7d256df9959,
achieved at http://perma.cc/BG45-DKUM (“Buying or selling a hotel operating under a
brand name requires special attention. Typically, the existing franchise agreement will be
assumed, terminated or modified in some way . . . .”).
52. Benoliel, supra note 29, at 92 (citing Jonathan D. Hibbard et al., Examining the
Impact of Destructive Acts in Marketing Channel Relationship, 38 J. MKTG. RES. 45 (2001)).
53. See Benoliel, supra note 29, at 93 (“According to an examination of the 626
questionnaires completed by dealers, as the level of a dealer’s economic dependence in the
relationship increases, she is less likely to respond by abandoning the relationship even in
the face of destructive acts by the franchisor.”).

ARTICLE 4 (EMERSON) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/7/16 2:54 PM

174

[Vol. 18:1

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

II.

THE FRENCH CONNECTION

The United States franchising community may learn from, and
perhaps incorporate concepts from, France. French franchising is among
the oldest, most thoroughly entrenched systems in the world.54 Indeed, the
growth of French franchising has been tremendous. In 1971, just thirtyfour domestic franchisors operated in France;55 within six years, the
number had tripled to approximately 108 networks (with about 7500 stores
or sites).56 In the fifteen years following (ending in 1992), the number had
grown to 430 networks and 21,300 franchises.57 Steady growth continued
throughout the 1990s and the following decade,58 with the franchisor
numbers ultimately tripling, and the number of franchisees increasing
250% by the start of 2010.59 Finally, by 2014, there were 1,796 franchise
networks, with 68,171 franchisees,60 continuing a steady increase of about
6% annually in each category (franchisors and total number of franchises)
for each of the past five years.61 International growth has also been
54. See Emerson, A French Comparison, supra note 22, at 316-17 (“In France, just a
few decades into the 20th Century, the ancestor of the modern franchise system appeared. In
the 1930s, a company called “La Lainiède Roubaix” developed the new type of distribution
under a trade name still famous in France to this day, Pingouin.”).
55. FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, TOUTE LA FRANCHISE: LES TEXTES, LES
CHIFFRES, LES RESEAUX [FRENCH FRANCHISING FEDERATION, ALL ABOUT FRANCHISING: THE
TEXTS, THE FIGURES, THE NETWORKS] 55 (2010) [hereinafter FRENCH FRANCHISING
FEDERATION, ALL ABOUT FRANCHISING]; FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, Les
chiffres-cles en France, http://www.franchise-fff.com/franchise/chiffres-cles/les-chiffrescles-en-france.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HL29-TBZY.
56. FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, Les Chiffres de la Franchise en 2007,
Tableau 1: La Franchise en France Depuis 1971 [Franchise Figures in 2007, Table 1: the
Franchise in France Since 1971] [hereinafter Franchise Figures in 2007] (on file with
author).
57. Id.
58. FRENCH FRANCHISING FEDERATION, ALL ABOUT FRANCHISING, supra, note 55, at 55
(recording that by 1997, 2001, and 2005, the franchisor and franchisee numbers had
increased, respectively, to 517 and 28,851, 653 and 32,240; and 929 and 39,510); see also
Press Release, Fédération Française de la Franchise, Résultats de la 8e Enquête Annuelle sur
la
Franchise
[Results
of
the
8th
Annual
Survey
on
Franchising],
http://www.groupebpce.fr/Journaliste/Actus-et-Communiques-de-Presse/Autres/BPResultats-de-la-8e-enquete-annuelle-sur-la-franchise (indicating that in 2011 the number of
franchisors in France was 1477 by September 2011, with the number of franchisees pegged
at 58,351).
59. See Franchise Figures in 2007, supra note 56 (recording the number of French
franchisors in 2009 as 1369); FRENCH FRANCHISING FEDERATION, ALL ABOUT FRANCHISING,
supra, note 55, at 55; FÉDÉRATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, Les chiffres-cles en France,
supra note 55.
60. See FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, Les chiffres-cles en France, supra
note 55 (indicating there were 1,796 franchisors and 68,171 franchisees in France in 2014).
61. See FRENCH FRANCHISING FEDERATION, ALL ABOUT FRANCHISING, supra, note 55,
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exponential; for example, in 2009 over 310 French networks exported their
concepts abroad, placing their product or service expertise in over 10,000
stores throughout the world, and the percentage of franchisors with units
outside of France continued to grow in the past five years, rising to nearly
600 (from under 23% in 2009 to over 30% five years later).62 This
movement abroad makes it difficult to determine how many French
franchise contracts have been created, and perhaps also terminated
throughout the world. However, one can estimate that the number must be
in the hundreds of thousands. Indeed, France has more franchisors than
any other European nation, and only five countries in the world have more
franchisors than France: Brazil, China, India, South Korea, and the United
States.63 Per capita, the French degree of franchising is far higher than any
of these nations except South Korea.64 Moreover, while the United States
continues to lead the world in numbers of franchisors (about 3000 as of
2008) and franchisees (about 900,000),65 its growth rate has slowed
compared to most other nations;66 larger, older American franchised
at 55 (indicating that there were 1369 franchise networks with 51,619 franchisees at the start
of 2010); FÉDÉRATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, Les chiffres-cles en France, supra note
55.
62. See FRENCH FRANCHISING FEDERATION, ALL ABOUT FRANCHISING, supra, note 55,
at 54 (indicating that there were 313 French franchisors operating franchises outside of
France by the start of 2010).
63. Compared to France’s 1369 franchised networks, the second and third highest
European nations were Spain (960) and Germany (910), with the five leading countries
being United States (3000), China (2600), South Korea (2426), India (1800), and Brazil
(1379). Id. at 57. Still, there is some question whether India’s or South Korea’s number of
franchisors is even close to the above number, and whether Brazil has yet overtaken France.
See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), GUIDE TO INT’L
MASTER FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENTS, Annex 2 at 272-73 (2d ed. 2007) (putting India’s and
Brazil’s number of franchisors below the French number, and not providing any information
about South Korea); see also CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, FIELD LISTING: GDP (OFFICIAL
EXCHANGE RATE) (2012) (listing the top 15 nations in order of the size of their gross
domestic product for 2012 as (1) United States, (2) China, (3) Japan, (4) Germany, (5)
France, (6) United Kingdom, (7) Brazil, (8) Italy, (9) Russia, (10) India, (11) Canada, (12)
Australia, (13) Spain, (14) Mexico, and (15) South Korea.)
64. That figure is derived by taking the franchise statistics already given and
comparing to national populations. For the latter, see WORLD ATLAS, COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD,
http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/ctypopls.htm#.UnXgSOLAHZQ
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9HKH-EZFB (listing 2012 figures
of national populations).
65. FÉDÉRATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, LES CHIFFRES-CLÉS À L’INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.franchise-fff.com/franchise/chiffres-cles/les-chiffres-cles-a-l-international.html,
4,000 franchise networks operating in China, 3,000 in United States, 2,426 in Brazil, 1,796
in France, the largest number in Europe, 1,200 in Canada, and 1,180 in Australia); Robert
W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 196-97 & n.24.
66. IFA EDUC. FOUND., INC., THE PROFILE OF FRANCHISING, VOLUME II: A STATISTICAL
PROFILE OF THE 1997 UNIFORM FRANCHISE OFFERING CIRCULAR (UFOC) DATA 46 (1999)
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systems now grow principally via foreign expansion,67 and some foreign
nations’ franchising grows much faster than does the U.S. system.68
If the growth and scale of the French franchising market is not
convincing enough, the gaps and imperfections of American franchise law
provide reasons for adopting differing models. As will be explored below,
the French system does not make actual and constructive terminations
synonymous, like the Supreme Court’s decision in Mac’s Shell.
A. Expiration, Termination, Suspension, and Flawed Performance
Generally, French judges have power to ensure that franchise
contracts are fair.69 This supervision often operates in tandem with the
duties of the franchise parties; for instance, termination of the franchise
contract creates different duties for the franchisor and franchisee.70 In the
end, those duties and the qualities arising therefrom may give the franchise
network an “identity” and a “reputation.”71 Mandatory provisions, such as
confidentiality and non-competition, provide each party the opportunity to
protect its own interests before, during, and after the contract.72
A typical French franchise contract is entered into for a specified
duration that can vary from one year to ten years.73 A sample contract
provision about the term of a French franchise contract states:

(stating that in 1996 the United States had 1170 franchisors).
67. Emerson, supra note 65, at 200 & n.43.
68. Emerson, supra note 65, at 196 & n.23.
69. Generally, franchise contract provisions have to be “legitimate, necessary and
proportionate” regarding the interests of both the contractual parties and, at a broader level,
the franchise network. See Gilles Amédée-Manesme, La Vraie Nature Juridique du Fonds
de Commerce du Franchisé et L’impact de L’appartenance à un Réseau en Cas de Cession
de ce Fonds de Commerce, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET AFFAIRES NO. 5, Feb. 4,
2010, 1110 (indicating that the terms legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality, serve as
testers in assessing contracts).
70. FRANÇOIS-LUC SIMON, THEORIE ET PRATIQUE DU DROIT DE LA FRANCHISE [THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF FRANCHISE LAW] 359-73 (2009).
71. Id. at 363-65 (discussing the franchisor’s and ex-franchisees’ rights and duties
concerning the distinctive signs of the franchise network, such as the trademarks).
72. Id. at 362-73; PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU, LES CONTRATS DE FRANCHISAGE 211-16,
297-99, 302-05 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing trademarks during the course of the franchise
relationship as well as upon termination; also considering post-termination restrictions on
competition).
73. If a “buying exclusivity” (“exclusivité d’achat”) provision is provided in the
contract, French commercial code fixes a maximum duration of 10 years. CODE DE
COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 330-1. If Community Law is applicable, the buying exclusivity
cannot last more than 5 years, but it should be possible to extend it because of the
transmission of the “know-how.” Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints,
2000 O.J. (C 291) 1, 10 (EC).
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The contract is concluded for a duration of five years from its
signature date. It can be tacitly renewed in the same condition,
for a length of [whatever is stated in the contract], unless, at least
six months before the deadline, one of the parties sends a notice
by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt that the
present contract will be terminated.74
This clause means that, if neither party takes any action (i.e., neither
party sends a termination letter), the contract automatically renews for the
length of time to which both sides agreed in the original contract.75 While
these methodologies are similar in the American franchise system,
differences begin to appear in the other doctrines of termination.
Other methods of termination include annulment or rescission when
circumstances vitiate consent.76 These circumstances in effect undermine
one of the four requisites for a valid contract, consent (the others being
capacity, a definite object, and lawful cause).77 The typical grounds for
annulment or rescission include duress,78 misrepresentation (fraud),79
impracticability, and, in some cases, mistake.80 A contract is also deemed
void due to illegality, undue influence, economic duress, or the franchisor
having lied during its provision of pre-contractual information.81 Further,
one party may terminate the contract when the other party breaches the
contract, i.e. fails to follow or deliver on any of the various provisions of

74. VERONIQUE SELINSKY, DROIT ECONOMIQUE: CONCURRENCE-DISTRIBUTIONCONSOMMATION, FORMULES DES CONTRATS, CONTRAT DE FRANCHISE DE DISTRIBUTION
(2002) (“Le contrat est conclu pour une durée de cinq ans à compter de sa signature. Il
pourra se renouveler ensuite tacitement dans les mêmes conditions pour une durée de < >,
à défaut de l’envoi par une des parties d’une notification par lettre recommandée avec avis
de réception de résiliation du présent contrat, six mois au moins avant l’échéance.”) (trans.
by Robert W. Emerson).
75. DICTIONNAIRE PERMANENT DROIT DES AFFAIRES 1372-73 n.85 (May 2006).
76. Id.; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1117 (Fr.).
77. Id. art. 1108.
78. Id. art. 1111-15.
79. Id. art. 1116.
80. Mistake only invalidates consent when the mistake rests on the very substance of
the thing which is the object of the contract. Id. art. 1110.
81. DICTIONNAIRE PERMANENT DROIT DES AFFAIRES, supra note 75, at 1372-73 n.85.
The nonperformance of the pre-contractual information provision will be qualified as a
“dol” (willful deception or deceit); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1108. “No cause” and “when
territory of franchisee is not determined” are also given as reasons for voidability. CODE DE
COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 330-3. See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] com., Feb. 12, 2008, Bull. civ IV, No. 07-10.462,
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000018132619.
See
also Daniel Mainguy, Jean-Louis Respaud, & Stéphane Destours, Droit de le Distribution,
LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET AFFAIRES NO. 19, May 7, 2009, 1479, archive at
http://perma.cc/YL45-MNH3 (discussing contract voidability in greater detail).
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the franchise agreement.82
In order for the contract to be officially deemed void or breached,
however, French Civil Code Article 1184 requires a judicial
pronouncement.83 In essence, this article states that until the judge
officially declares the contract breached (and perhaps damages are
awarded), the contract remains in effect.84 In the meantime, the party that
moved the action to the courts can also choose to force the performance of
the contract. Tremendous judicial discretion gives French judges an
“appreciation power” (un pouvoir d’appréciation) to assess and respond to
the seriousness of an alleged breach.85 The judge can grant the breaching
party additional time in light of the circumstances;86 however, this
82. See SIMON, supra note 70, at 338 (stating that when a party breaches its duty to
carry out the contract, then, per the French Civil Code, a termination is in order). Under
Article 1184 of the Code Civil, the non-breaching party may either force the other party,
when possible, to perform its obligation or request termination with damages and interest.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1184 (Fr.).
83. SIMON, supra note 70, at 339; CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.], supra note 82, art. 1184 (Fr.).
The Article declares:
La condition résolutoire est toujours sous-entendue dans les contrats synallagmatiques,
pour le cas où l’une des deux parties ne satisfera point à son engagement.
Dans ce cas, le contrat n’est point résolu de plein droit. La partie envers laquelle
l’engagement n’a point été exécuté, a le choix ou de forcer l’autre à l’exécution de la
convention lorsqu’elle est possible, ou d’en demander la résolution avec dommages et
intérêts.
La résolution doit être demandée en justice, et il peut être accordé au défendeur un délai
selon les circonstances.
84. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Nov. 22,
1983, Bull. civ. III, No. 239. There are certain cases, however, in which a judicial
pronouncement is unnecessary. The most common is the non-performance exception,
“l’exception d’inexécution,” which permits a party to suspend temporarily its performance
of the contract while it, in effect, awaits the overdue performance of the other side. ALAIN
BÉNABENT, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 500 (10th ed. 2005). The French courts have
recognized the non-performance exception on their own, with the only Civil Code provision
directly on point concerning contracts for the sale of goods. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1612
(Fr.) (“The seller is not obliged to deliver the thing where the buyer does not pay the price
of it unless the seller has granted him time for the payment.”) (trans. by Robert W.
Emerson).
Note that in the 1983 Cour de Cassation decision, the French high court held that the court
of appeal did not properly analyze the severity of the alleged breach (it was a sales contract),
hence the Cour de Cassation reversed the Cour d’Appel decision and put the parties back in
the situation they were in before the court of appeal decision.
85. BÉNABENT, supra note 84, at 264.
86. If the terms of a contract require performance by a particular time, and if the
breaching party fails to perform adequately but could correct that failure either before the
contractual performance time expires or at least well before the non-breaching party needed
that performance (e.g., in order to meet its own duties to others), the court could give the
breaching party a set period, within those time constraints, within which it must correct the
failed performance.
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extension cannot be renewed indefinitely,87 with even force majeure88
leading only to a brief suspension of deadlines, nothing more.89
While ruling on a termination request due to non-performance of the
contract’s terms, a French judge may note that non-performance has
occurred90; he or she can set a non-extendable deadline by which time the
non-performing party must take remedial actions.91 In a 1987 case, the
Cour de Cassation affirmed a lower court’s decision to terminate a contract
because the non-performing party had not met the one-year deadline it had
been granted to perform its obligations.92 In cases of total non-

87. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Dec. 19, 1984, Bull. civ. I, No. 343 (denying a renewal of the deadline, the French Supreme
Court overturned a lower appeals court decision, stating that the court could only suspend a
deadline, not set a second definite extension).
88. A French term literally meaning “superior force,” this legal concept concerns an
“event or effect that can neither be anticipated nor controlled,” which could excuse a party
from contractual obligation, and includes both acts of nature, such as floods, and acts of
people, such as riots or strikes. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 761 (10th ed. 2014). The term is
found in both American and French law. In the French law of obligations, a breach of
contract may be excused if the nonperformance of a contractually required result arises from
force majeure, an irresistible, unforeseeable event outside the sphere (e.g., activities) for
which the obliged party is responsible. JOHN BELL, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 342345 (2d ed. 2008).
89. Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec. 19,
1984, Bull. civ. I, No. 343.
90. The nonbreaching party raises the issue and the judge is asked to raise his power of
appreciation to deem the franchise contract void.
91. Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec. 19,
1984, Bull. civ. I, No. 343 (“[L]orsque le juge, saisi d’une demande de révocation d’une
donation pour cause d’inexécution des conditions, a constaté cette inexécution, il peut
accorder au donataire un délai qui doit emprunter sa mesure aux circonstances pour
exécuter ces charges . . . . [C]e délai, qui peut être suspendu en cas de force majeure, ne
peut être renouvelé.”). Once the deadline passes, the judge must decide if the breaching
party cured; if the judge finds in the negative, he must terminate the contract. Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., June 16, 1987, Bull. civ. IV, No.
145.
92. Exercising their sovereign power of assessment, trial judges that deem one
party’s failure to meet its contractual obligations not serious enough to have a judicially
ordered retroactive or prospective termination of the contract, do not change the object of
their inquiry related to these ends [an ordered termination], when they, in accordance with
the circumstances of the case, determine the conditions and deadlines of performance.
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., June 16, 1987, Bull.
civ. IV, No. 145 (“[L]es juges du fond qui, par une appréciation souveraine, estiment que
les manquements d’une partie à ses obligations contractuelles ne sont pas d’une gravité
suffisante pour motiver la résolution ou la résiliation de la convention ne modifient pas
l’objet de la demande tendant à l’une de ces fins lorsqu’ils prescrivent l’exécution, dans les
conditions et délai qu’ils déterminent, eu égard aux circonstances de la cause.”) (trans. by
Robert W. Emerson). See also CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1184 (Fr.) (“The resolution must be
requested in court, and the defendant may be granted a period in the circumstances.”) (trans.
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performance, however, a judicial termination will be made unless a time
extension is granted, as described above.93
When a party partially performs the contract, the judge will look at the
seriousness of the breach to determine whether the entire contract is
jeopardized, in which case termination is justified.94 In a 1996 case, the
Commercial and Financial Chamber of the Cour de Cassation reviewed a
lower court holding about the lease for a restaurant-nightclub property and
an accompanying license to operate a pub on that property.95 The high
court faulted the lower court’s failure to understand the remedies for partial
breaches of the agreement,96 which was a type of contract referred to as a
synallagmatic contract.97 Along these lines, partial non-performance during
the performance time limit allowed can justify a French judge’s decision to
order a total, retroactive termination of the contract.
Judicial termination can also be sought after a mise en demeure (“a
notice”) is performed. However, if the infringed obligation is an obligation
de ne pas faire (“a duty to not do”), the notice will not be required due to
the nature of the obligation.98 Courts may consider the document

by Google); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., June 10,
1970, Bull. civ II (holding that trial judges have sovereign authority to decide whether the
time limits set by Article 1244 of the French Civil Code may be granted to the debtor).
93. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., June 16, 1987,
Bull. civ. IV, No. 145.
94. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., July 2, 1996,
Bull. civ. IV, No. 198.
95. Id.
96. The court wrote, “en réservant la résolution d’un contrat synallagmatique aux
seuls cas d’inexécution totale par l’une des parties de ses obligations, alors qu’une telle
résolution peut être prononcée par le juge en cas d’inexécution partielle dès lors qu’elle
porte sur une obligation déterminante de la conclusion du contrat, la cour d’appel, qui a
méconnu l’étendue de ses pouvoirs, a violé le texte susvisé par refus d’application.” Id. The
English interpretation of this holding is as follows: A judge can decide whether there is (or
should be) a termination even in a case of only partial non-performance, as long as the nonperformance concerns a substantial obligation of those entering into a contract. Id. Note
that the court faulted the lower court for not understanding its own powers in termination
cases. Id. (trans. by Robert W. Emerson).
97. Because consideration is not required for a valid, enforceable contract under Civil
Law, the term “synallagmatic contract” applies to those arrangements which go beyond the
enforceable, but quite possibly one-sided, Civil Law “deals” lacking reciprocity (e.g.,
promises to make a gift). The term reaches those “mutual agreements” (the Greek meaning
of synallagma) where a genuinely reciprocal obligation exists – where both parties to the
contract have, in effect, agreed to correlative obligations, what common law jurisdictions
would refer to as a bilateral contract. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (10th ed. 2014)
(defining a bilateral contract as one involving reciprocal obligations, where the obligations
of one party correlate to those of the other).
98. That is, the infringement of this obligation is done directly by accomplishing the
prohibited act(s) stipulated in the contract. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
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instituting the proceedings, l’acte introductif d’instance (“the originating
process”), to be sufficient notice.99
At times, judges may also interpret the contract terms and the parties’
past and subsequent actions as implying the retroactive termination of the
franchise agreement as if the franchise agreement had never existed.100 In
that case, each party will have to return what he has received from the
other.101 In addition, a party can seek damages for any injury, so long as
the presiding judge ultimately holds that the contract termination is
insufficient to repair that party’s injury.102 The judge might also find both
parties liable if both failed to fulfill their respective contractual obligations.
In that case, the judge will determine each party’s level of injury and
terminate the contract.103 Alternatively, the parties can draft in their
contract a termination clause known as a clause résolutoire.
B. An Express Provision in the Contract: The Clause Résolutoire
An example of a resolution clause is as follows:
In case of breach of the present contract, it will automatically be
terminated in the forms and conditions anticipated in article 19
[of this contract]. In case of serious or repeated faults, the
contract will be terminated automatically if no cure is done in a
timeline of 48 hours or thirty days following the reception of a

judicial matters] 3e civ., Oct. 25, 1968, JurisData 1968-000414.
99. Therefore, a summons or some other writ – e.g., something similar to an injunction
– will not be needed. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Jan. 23, 2001, JurisData 2001-007872.
100. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] #e civ., May 4, 1898,
No. #. What may make this confusing to English-speaking common law practitioners is the
use of the term “condition subsequent” for parties’ behavior that, under American law,
seems to be as much a breach or a discharge by operation of law, not necessarily something
usually more specific. CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.] art. 1183 (Fr.) (“A condition subsequent is one
which, when it is fulfilled, brings about the revocation of the obligation, and which puts
things back in the same condition as if the obligation had not existed.”) (trans. by Robert W.
Emerson).
101. Article 1183 of the French Civil Code states: “It does not suspend the fulfillment of
the obligation, it only compels the creditor to return what he has received, in the case where
the event contemplated by the condition happens.” CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.] art. 1183 (Fr.)
(trans. by Robert W. Emerson).
102. Article 1147 of the French Civil Code states: “A debtor shall be ordered to pay
damages, if there is occasion, either by reason of the non-performance of the obligation, or
by reason of delay in performing, whenever he does not prove that the non-performance
comes from an external cause which may not be ascribed to him, although there is no bad
faith on his part.” CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.] art. 1147 (Fr.) (trans. By Robert W. Emerson).
103. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Jan. 3, 1978,
Bull. civ. IV, No. 76-13.919.
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mail pointing out the termination provision, reproducing exactly
its wording.
In addition, the parties agree that:
In application of the article L. 441-6 of the commerce code, the
late penalty will be calculated on the basis of 1.5 times the legal
interest rate, and increased by the possible collection fees:
-that the present contract will be automatically terminated if the
franchisee comes to owe to the franchisor a sum superior or equal
to . . . Euros, 15 days after delivery of a payment order
referencing the present termination provision;
-that the totality of the sum will become immediately payable and
that the present contract will be automatically terminated in case
of nonpayment . . . 15 days after delivery of a payment order
referring to the present termination provision.104
In this provision, the franchisor can state several reasons to justify a
termination. These include non-payment of royalties, wrongful disclosure
of sales and organization methods, bad management, failure to pay for
goods delivered by the franchisor,105 refusal to implement controls, and
noncompliance with non-compete provisions.106 This clause résolutoire is

104. DICTIONNAIRE PERMANENT, DROIT DES AFFAIRES, CONTRAT DE FRANCHISE (Nov.
2005), 5312A, n.27 (“En cas de violation du présent contrat, celui-ci sera résolu de plein
droit dans les conditions et formes prévues à l’article 19. De même, en cas de fautes graves
ou répétées, le contrat sera résolu de plein droit si aucune régularisation n’intervient dans
un délai de 48h ou de trente jours suivant la réception d’un courrier visant la présente
clause résolutoire, en en reproduisant expressément les termes.
Les parties conviennent en outre que :
En application de l’article L.446-6 du code de commerce, les pénalités de retard seront
calculées sur la base de 1,5 fois le taux de l’intérêt légal, et majorées des frais éventuels de
recouvrement :
-que le présent contrat sera résolu de plein droit si le franchisé vient à devoir au
franchiseur une somme supérieure ou égale à . . . Euros, 15 jours après délivrance d’un
commandement de payer visant la présente clause résolutoire ;
-que la totalité de la somme deviendra immédiatement exigible et que le présent contrat sera
résolu de plein droit en cas de non-paiement . . . 15 jours après délivrance d’un
commandement de payer visant la clause résolutoire”) (trans. by Robert W. Emerson).
105. DICTIONNAIRE PERMANENT DROIT DES AFFAIRES, supra note 75, at 1373 n.86.
There is no jurisprudence to illustrate these cases. This might be explained by the fact that
these cases never went to court, and that we know about them simply through the contract
itself.
106. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Douai, 2e ch., Dec. 5, 1991, No.
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intended to deprive the judge of his appreciation power.107 Because, for
these fact patterns, the judge cannot adequately measure a breach’s
seriousness, the judge can only “record” the termination that happened
automatically, no matter how severe or slight the breach in fact was.108
Hence, many, if not most, French franchise contracts have express
termination provisions, clauses de résolution expresse, which anticipate the
possibility of retroactive termination (résolution) in case of nonperformance. However, the French courts demand absolute clarity from
these resolution clauses.109 In effect, without a clear, absolute contractual
provision, the judges may supervise the manner and substance of a
termination as if the contractual clause did not exist. The judges will
decide, according to the facts, whether the contract should be terminated or
not.110

3605/91; Olivier Gast, Note, LES PETITES AFFICHES, July 1, 1992, at 66 (indicating that
noncompliance for non-compete provisions are less likely to be in a contract clause because
the franchisor drafts the franchise agreement; the franchisee can also request termination in
several situations, including when the franchisor has been competing with the franchisee,
directly or indirectly, when the franchisor refuses to supply the franchisee or to give
assistance, or when the franchisor does not have enough advertisement for his franchise
network). See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., July
12, 1993, Bull. civ. IV No. 91-20540 (finding insufficient advertising); Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Feb. 19, 1991, Bull. civ. IV, No. 88-19809
(finding no supplies or assistance).
107. BÉNABENT, supra note 84, at 272. Other commentators, however, emphasize that
the clause must be undertaken in good faith and that its control over judicial prerogatives
may be limited. LE TOURNEAU, supra note 72, at 287; SIMON, supra.note 70, at 347.
108. BENABENT, supra note 84, at 272. This “record” can be performed through a
procedure called référé. It is an emergency, oral and simplified procedure, as provided in a
number of articles, particularly Articles 145 and 808, of the French Civil Procedure Code.
AUGUSTIN AYNES & XAVIER VUITTON, DROIT DE LA PREUVE : PRINCIPES ET MISE EN OUVRE
PROCESSUELLE 252-57 (2013); SERGE GUINCHARD, CECILE CHAINAIS & FREDERIQUE
FERRAND, PROCEDURE CIVILE: DROIT INTERNE ET DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE 1362-68
(31st ed. 2012).
109. BÉNABENT, supra note 84, at 273. As stated by the Cour de Cassation in a case
issuing the principle (“arrêt de principe”), “the automatic termination provision, that takes
away from the judges the ability to oversee the agreement’s termination, must be expressed
in an unequivocal manner, and if not so expressed the judges recover their power to oversee
the termination.” Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov.
25, 1986, Bull. civ. I, No. 279 (“Attendu que la clause résolutoire de plein droit, qui permet
aux parties de soustraire la résolution d’une convention à l’appréciation des juges, doit être
exprimée de manière non équivoque, faute de quoi les juges recouvrent leur pouvoir
d’appréciation.”) (trans. by Robert W. Emerson).
110. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Bull. civ. I,
November 25, 1986, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 1986. In this case, a woman sold a
house to her niece for 30,000 francs, with the buyer paying 5,000 francs in cash and the
balance to be paid via the buyer’s payment of the seller’s water, electricity and heating bills
for the seller’s own house. The parties inserted a termination provision in the contract:
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The resolution-clause-as-termination-provision can penalize only
expressly stipulated obligations in the contract.111 In the words of the Cour
de Cassation: “The termination provision can only be triggered by the
failure to perform an express provision of the lease.”112 In that case, the
litigation involved a commercial lease contract.113 The lessees were
constructing a building on the rented premises, and the landlord invoked
the termination provision to demand the lessees return the premises to their
original state.114 However, because this requirement was not an expressly
stipulated duty, use of the termination provision was inappropriate.115 In
the case of commercial leases, the provision comes into play only after a
notice, a mise en demeure, is given.116 Such notice must describe in detail
If the charges are not performed, and 30 days after a simple notice containing a declaration
by the seller of her intent to use the benefit of this provision, if the charges remain unpaid,
the seller will have the right, if it appears good to her, to let the termination of the sale be
decreed against the non-performing purchasers.
Id. (“A défaut d’exécution des charges convenues et trente jours après une simple mise en
demeure d’exécuter contenant déclaration par la venderesse de son intention de se
prévaloir du bénéfice de cette clause et restée sans effet, celle-ci aura le droit, si bon lui
semble, de faire prononcer à l’encontre des acquéreurs défaillants la résolution de la vente,
nonobstant l’offre postérieure d’exécution.”) (trans. by Robert W. Emerson). This provision
was deemed to be equivocal, allowing the court to use its power of appreciation and set its
own terms for termination.
111. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., May 18,
1988, Bull. civ. III, No. 94.
112. Id. (“La clause résolutoire ne peut être mise en œuvre que pour un manquement à
une stipulation expresse du bail.”) (trans. by Robert W. Emerson). In the absence of an
express provision, the termination provision cannot be triggered. Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Ap. 29, 1985, Defrénois 1986, art. 33700 spéc.
No. 32, p.458, note Vermelle; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
3e civ., June 11, 1986, Bull. civ. III,, No. 92 (applying this rule in another context). Also,
the termination provision could only be triggered by the infringement of an express
provision, but not by the infringement of the law, except if there is an express reference to it
or them in the contract. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e
civ., June 11, 1986, Bull. civ. III No. 92, at 73 (finding that sub-leases are forbidden by
Article 21 of the Decree 53-960 of September 30, 1953, which rules the relationship
between lessors and lessees regarding the renewal of residential leases, or of leases for
commercial, industrial, or craftsman premises, and also ruling that the lessor could not
trigger the termination contract because neither sub-lease was forbidden by an express
provision nor was an express provision referring to the Decree).
113. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., May 18,
1988, Bull. civ., III, No. 94.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. French law distinguishes “clause résolutoire” contracts that may not need a “mise
en demeure” from others which do. The former are said to be “de plein droit,” meaning that
nonperformance automatically terminates the contract.
See Henri-Xavier Ortoli,
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES LAW Fra-24 (eds. Andrew P. Loewinger & Michael K.
Lindsey, 2006) (noting that, unless the franchise contract specifically expresses that a
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the breaches, the reasons for the anticipated termination, and the deadline
for curing the breaches. In a 1968 case, the Cour de Cassation stated that a
mise en demeure has to indicate in a precise manner the alleged failures
that must be remedied.117 In that case, the lessor was poorly advised about
the nature and scope of the offenses that it was ordered to stop.118 The
court held that he was not at fault for failing to satisfy, within the onemonth deadline, the action to which he was subjected.119
Numerous commentators wish that judges had the power to modify
the termination provision in the same manner that they can modify penalty
provisions.120 The terminology here is somewhat confusing. French law
distinguishes résolution and résiliation. The main distinction is the effect
of each regime upon termination. A termination-résolution typically
concerns one-time execution contracts, such as the sale of a car between
non-merchant individuals. The contract not only has no future effect, but
past events are deemed never to have actually existed, thus returning
everything to the status quo ante.121
For the contrats à exécution successive, that is, successively executed
contracts, such as franchise contracts or lease agreements, there is no need
for past events to be “destroyed.” That form of termination, called
résiliation,122 only applies prospectively.123 For example, a franchisee
particular default or instance of poor performance is a type of complete breach for which no
notice need be afforded to the breaching party, then the non-breaching party must first
provide the breaching party with notice and a chance to cure). See also, Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Nov. 28, 1968, Bull. civ. III, No. 498
(discussing the content of the notice required by French law).
117. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Nov. 28,
1968, Bull. civ. III, No. 498.
118. Id.
119. Id. The provision loses its automatic effect if the other party also fails to perform
its own obligation. Furthermore, due to the reciprocity of the wrongs, the judges get their
power of appreciation back. BÉNABENT, supra note 84, at 472; Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] com., Mar. 17, 1992, Bull. civ. IV, No. 476. In cases of
bad faith, the courts have increasingly tended to suspend the effect of that provision. Cour
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 31, 1995, Bull. civ. I,
No. 203; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Feb. 16,
1999, Bull. civ. I, No. 96-21.997; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134 (“The resolution must be
requested in court, and the defendant may be granted a period in the circumstances.”) (trans.
by Google).
120. Jacques Mestre, Nouvelles limites à la mise en œuvre des clauses résolutoires [New
Limits to the Establishment of Termination Provisions], 316 RTD civ., (1989); F. Osman,
Le pouvoir modérateur du juge dans la mise en œuvre de la clause résolutoire de plein droit
[The Judge’s Power to Moderate in the Establishment of the Automatic Termination
Provision], Répertoire Defrenois, 65 (1993).
121. BENABENT, supra note 84, at 268.
122. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 1, 1996,
Bull. civ. I, No. 332. Successive execution of a contract – something akin to a continuing or
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could not request the reimbursement of royalties paid to the franchisor for
the period of time not actually challenged by the franchisee, such as when
the franchise agreement functioned well. In effect, the situation is similar
to the difference in common law remedies between a breached executory
contract and a breached executed contract.124 For the former, a “clause
résolutoire” may make more sense, as the contractual relationship has just
begun and performance issues have already arisen. As time passes and the
contractual relationship becomes more stable and long-term, then, when
there is a breach in performance, the résiliation regime applies more
effectively than the resolution regime.
C. Special Solutions: The Non-Performance Exception and the
Unilateral Termination
A temporary non-performance exception, exception d’inexécution,
arises when a party refuses to perform its obligations because the other
party did not perform its duties. While this exception is a temporary
device, its effect is an immediate suspension of the contract. Built into this
is a public order mechanism, relève de l’ordre public, which follows from
the structure of the contract itself. Therefore, as a matter of public
policy,125 a prohibition of non-performance exceptions cannot be drafted
into a contract provision.
Unfortunately, no article in the French Civil Code defines the nonperformance exception, and Article 1612 approaches it solely within the
context of the sale of goods.126 However, French case law, as a common
law doctrine, has acknowledged the right to suspend any expectation of
continued performance from the party that has not received satisfaction.
Some conditions still must be met for the non-performance exception to be
valid. First, it must be a contrat synallagmatique, that is, a contract where
there is consideration given by both of the parties.127 Second, the breach
must be so grave as to justify the other party’s lack of performance
(inexecution); this would be a factual inquiry for the court. When there is
relational contract in the United States – might be termed “résolu” meaning resolution but
with the effects of a “résiliation.” See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 720-25 (2013) (discussing franchise agreements as
relational pacts).
123. This prospective termination (“résiliation”) is distinguished from one which even
has a retroactive effect (“résolution”).
124. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “executed contract”
and “executory contract”).
125. I.e., public policy concerns about the nature of that type of contract.
126. BÉNABENT, supra note 84, at 500.
127. For a discussion of synallagmatic contracts, see infra note 97.
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only a partial breach, the non-breaching party may only suspend its
obligations in proportion to the non-performance of the breaching party’s
obligations.128
Another limited approach is unilateral termination. Under French law,
this is strictly an emergency measure, and one for which a notice period,
délai de préavis, or a notice to perform, mise en demeure, is not required.129
French contract law considers termination by judicial proclamation to be
the norm. An exception to this principle, the extrajudicial unilateral
termination, is recognized only in cases of emergency where there are,
either currently or potentially, severely harmful consequences130 resulting
from one of the contractual parties’ behavior. The present or possible
injury justifies the other party’s unilateral termination of the contract,131 but
is done at the party’s own risk and expense.132 Continuing or threatening to
unlawfully display a trademark, or violating public safety laws,133 surely
constitutes an emergency for invoking this exception. Refusal to pay
royalties may fall short, however, as the non-performing party’s acts have
to be “serious”134 and urgent.135 Even if the contract has a termination

128. BENABENT, supra note 84, at 229.
129. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 13,
1998, Bull. civ. I, No. 96-21.485.
130. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 28,
2003, Bull. civ. I, No. 01-03.662 (“[L]a gravité du comportement.”).
131. This only applies to fixed-term contracts. Contracts with an indefinite period do
not raise the question of the existence of the right to unilaterally terminate the contract.
Those contracts can be terminated unilaterally. The issue is different for fixed-term
contracts, such as franchise contracts or commercial leases.
132. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 28,
2003, Bull. civ. I, No. 01-03.662 (“Attendu que la gravité du comportement d’une partie à
un contrat peut justifier que l’autre partie y mette fin de façon unilatérale à ses risques et
périls, peu important que le contrat soit à durée déterminée ou non.”).
133. Such laws include health code regulations for food preparation or safety standards
for workers.
134. The “seriousness” is not defined by the jurisprudence. In Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 28, 2003, Bull civ. I, No. 01-03.662 as in
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 13, 1998, Bull
civ. I, No. 96-21.485, “seriousness” was characterized by the contractual breach committed
by one of the parties. In the first case, a company did not respect the contract during two
months, putting the other party in a difficult financial situation. In the second case, an
anesthesiologist breached his contract with an hospital, which forbade him to conduct visits
outside of the hospital. There, the behavior of the anesthesiologist created a dangerous
situation for the hospital and its patients, and made planning difficult.
135. An emergency can be characterized as “urgent” if the contractual infringement
creates financial difficulties that are too heavy for the non-infringing party to bear or if it
constitutes a dangerous situation for the party bearing the contractual infringement. See
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 28, 2003, Bull
civ. I, No. 01-03.662 (one year into an 18-month consulting contract that a company, Barep,
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clause, a unilateral termination can be successfully challenged if a breach is
not severe, or if the situation is not an emergency.136
D. Constructive Termination in French Franchise Law
Now that the general constructs of the French franchise laws have
been detailed, the Author will turn to how the doctrine of constructive
termination differs in French franchise law. The French franchisor must
perform its contractual obligations in good faith, including the provision of
commercial and financial assistance to the franchisee for the duration of the
contract.137 Without this continual aid or know-how, the contract can be
terminated.138 However, the doctrine of constructive termination arises
differently in the French franchising context. Instead, if a court finds that
the alleged franchising arrangement is actually something else, such as a
salary arrangement, rather than the independent contract associated with
franchising, then constructive termination arises. This differs from the
Americanized concept of constructive termination, in which there is no
reclassification of the franchise relationship as some other contractual
relationship.
The concept of constructive termination is recognized in French law,

S.A., had awarded to a financial services company, “SFL,” the latter company failed to
perform the contract for two months; Barep was justified in unilaterally terminating the
contract before its fixed term had expired – that would not be an “abusive rupture” of the
contract on Barep’s part if SFL’s breach was grave (in effect, harmful to Barep)); see also
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 13, 1998, Bull
civ. I, No. 96-21.485 (M.X., an anesthesiologist partner in a private medical clinic
partnership called Clinique des Ormeaux, had a contract with Clinique providing for thirty
years of his exclusive services in return for M.X.’s obtaining ownership of Clinique shares,
and Clinique terminated M.X. after nine years due to M.X.’s numerous, serious
professional failings, including jeopardizing the health of patients; the high court recognized
the gravity of M.X.’s misconduct and thus rejected his appeal from the lower appellate
court’s upholding of Cinique’s unilateral termination of M.X.).
136. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Feb. 10, 2009,
Bull. civ. IV, No. 08-12.415; Laurent Leveneur, Où la Résiliation aux Risques et Périls du
Créancier Sert à éviter les Formalités Prévues par une Clause Résolutoire!, CONTRATS
CONCURRENCE CONSOMMATION NO. 5, May 2009.
137. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Savoir-Faire, 90 TUL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming
2016).
138. This duty extends both ways. The franchisor must supply aid, but the franchisee
must do what is necessary to accept and use the know-how that the franchisor endeavors to
transmit to the franchisee. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, 1e ch., Sept.
15, 2000, No. 978Q/00; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, 1e ch., June 11,
1992 (Dalloz 1992 Somm. p. 391, obs. Didier Ferrier). Also, Article 1134 alinéa 3 of the
French Civil Code requires the franchisee to perform its contractal obligations in good faith
and to cooperate with the franchisor. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
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but mostly in the employment arena. The law is similar to the American
law of constructive discharge, which occurs when an employer’s conduct
towards an employee is so severe that the employee in effect dismisses
herself. When a claim for constructive discharge is brought in the United
States, courts evaluate the events surrounding the employee’s departure
from employment.139 There is no requirement that the employee object to
the employers’ actions towards the employee.
Under French law, judges are not bound by the classification of the
business relationship chosen by the parties under their contract, and can reclassify the contract as something else;140 so, if a judge determines that the
matter at hand is actually employment in nature, the franchisee could
receive protection.141 Ordinarily, this would be the case if the franchisee
performs its duties in a place provided by the franchisor, if the franchisee
sells products provided exclusively by the franchisor, and if prices are
determined by the franchisor.142 The constructive termination doctrine can
then apply to a franchise agreement that has been reclassified as an
employment contract; considering the franchisor’s behavior, the franchisee
may then be entitled to damages.143
French law is more likely to treat a franchisee as an employee or
consumer. This permits the implementation of constructive termination or
139. 33 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 235 § 8 (1995). See also Holton v. Hart Mill Co.,
166 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1946) (applying the constructive discharge doctrine).
140. See DIDIER FERRIER, INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION INSTITUTE, Country Report
France: Franchising (2012) (describing how judicial approval is needed to cancel a contract
for breach of contract).
141. Judges look for a “subordination link” between supposed franchise parties. This
link is defined as “the execution of work under the authority of the employer who has the
power to give orders and directives and to control the execution and to sanction the failures
of the subordinated party.” Thibaut Khadir & Thomas Corre, Are Franchises Subject to
Labor
Law?,
ASSOCIATION
OF
CORPORATE
COUNSEL
(Dec.
3
2013),
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/qcafsll.cfm?makepdf=1,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/EA4N-G8Q6 (internal citation omitted) (establishing the interconnection of
franchises and labor law within the European Union, and France in particular). Where a
“subordination link” is found, the judge will reclassify the contract as an employment
contract and hold the franchisor to its managerial responsibilities under the contract. Id.
For more on franchisee associations and franchise collective bargaining, see Robert W.
Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can Franchisee Associations Serve as a Substitute for Franchisee
Protection Laws?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 99 (2013) (providing additional information on
franchisee associations and franchise collective bargaining); see also Robert W. Emerson,
Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503 (1990)
(providing additional information on franchisee associations and franchise collective
bargaining).
142. If these three elements are met, the franchisee can benefit from provisions in the
French employment code. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. 7321-1 (Fr.).
143. See Khadir & Corre, supra note 141 (discussing how labor law may be applicable
when the franchisor treats the franchisee as a subordinate).
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similar remedies.144 Such interpretations and reclassifications are not
prominent in American law. Thus, the Mac’s Shell reasoning, if applied
beyond the PMPA, to business format franchising generally, could prove
damaging to American franchises by withdrawing the claim for
constructive termination for all franchisees, both PMPA-regulated and nonPMPA-regulated businesses alike. The franchisee-as-employee model is
controversial, and likely unworkable except in extreme cases.145 Moreover,
144. The most pro-franchisee nation in terms of overtly declaring franchisees to be
consumers is South Africa. Recently enacted consumer protection laws in South Africa
treat franchisees as just another class of protected persons, similar to consumers. Consumer
Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees as Consumers:
The South African Example, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 455 (2014) (discussing how South
Africa’s Consumer Protection Act treats franchisees as consumers); Dani Cohen & Natasha
Smuts, Consumer Protection Act Regulations an Urgent Wakeup Call for Franchisors,
WEBBER
WENTZEL
(July
18,
2011),
http://www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/content/en/ww/ww-in-thenews?oid=31619&sn=Detail-2011&pid=32749, archived at http://perma.cc/2SZ4-QPUH
(noting that, in South Africa, regulations cover all franchise contracts entered into or
renewed after March 31, 2011, and provide franchisees “almost all of the same consumer
rights in their relationship with the franchisor, as any other consumer has”); Lucinde
Rhoodie & Belinda Scriba, Franchise Agreements and the Consumer Protection Act,
POLITY, (April 8, 2011), http://www.polity.org.za/article/franchise-agreements-and-theconsumer-protection-act-2011-04-08, archived at http://perma.cc/N2FT-SRV6 (describing
South Africa’s Consumer Protection Act’s effects on franchising).
145. See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding a
franchisee qualified as an employee). Coverall is a franchised janitorial service, and the
Awuah holding in favor of employment status for Coverall’s Massachusetts franchisees
entitles the franchisees to significant protections under federal, state, and local employment
laws, minimum wage laws, and overtime wage laws. The Awuah holding led Coverall to
cease its franchising operations in Massachusetts. Alisa Harrison, Ruling Threatens
Viability of Franchise Business in Massachusetts, INTL FRANCHISE ASS’N (March 29, 2010),
http://www.franchise.org/Franchise-News-Detail.aspx?id=50412,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/ZR6Z-69Y9. More importantly, for purposes of the franchising community,
Awuah’s implications instantly became highly controversial and far-reaching. Julie Bennett,
Pandora’s Law: When Franchisees Are Ruled Employees, All Bets Are Off, FRANCHISE
TIMES (May 2010), http://www.franchisetimes.com/May-2010/Pandoras-Law/, archived at
http://perma.cc/P68V-FRHW ; see also Robert W. Emerson, Assessing Awuah v. Coverall
North America, Inc.: The Franchisee as a Dependent Contractor, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
203 (2014) [hereinafter Assessing Awuah] (analyzing Awuah and its aftermath, and
concluding that franchisees need additional protections including the right to form
associations and to enter into collective bargaining agreements); Sheri Qualters, Judge
Certifies Class of Cleaning Workers Misclassified as ‘Franchisees’, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 13,
2012, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202542173592, archived at
http://perma.cc/PH4P-MUH6 (“[P]laintiffs contend that the company is liable for minimum
wage, overtime and wage law violations.”); Janet Sparks, Coverall Ruling Sends Shiver
Through
Franchising,
BLUE
MAUMAU
(May
14,
2010,
6:07
PM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/8907/awuah_decision_sends_shiver_through_franchising,
archived at http://perma.cc/8ZPB-7RFP (“[T]his is not a case ultimately that is limited to
Coverall or commercial cleaning business.”).
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constructive termination – at least in its general sense – is not easily applied
under French law. Thus, guidance from afar, such as from France, may
have to come to areas as discussed above: performance suspensions,
resolution clauses, unilateral termination principles, and other doctrines and
processes. These areas are undeveloped or less structured in America’s
franchise system and, because of this, an integration of only parts of the
French franchise laws would result in gaps and incongruity.
III.

WHY CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION WORKS

A. The Difficulties of Proving Actual Termination
Shell Oil argued before the Supreme Court that it would be impossible
to articulate a standard that could be used in constructive termination.146
Shell Oil’s argument proved persuasive, and the Court held that for
behavior to be prohibited by the PMPA, it must cause actual termination of
the franchise.147 It is nearly impossible to prove actual termination, but if
actual termination occurs, the franchisee is left in a precarious financial
state that constructive termination aims to prevent.
Under the Court’s analysis, termination does not occur until one of the
parties demonstrates the intent to end its dealings with the other party;148
however, proving intent is invariably a difficult task. While, generally,
termination can take many forms,149 the Mac’s Shell Court casts aside
constructive termination, despite the fact that it may be just as harmful to a
contractual relationship as actual termination.150
Franchisees “should not have to wait until the end of the relationship
to defend themselves from predatory practices by a franchisor.”151 The

146. Reply Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 11-12.
147. Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 190. The Court’s reasoning is misguided; drastically
raising the rent essentially does force an end to the franchise.
148. Id. This accords with the usual principles for express and constructive termination.
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FRANCHISE AND DEALERSHIP TERMINATION HANDBOOK
14 (2d ed. 2012).
149. The ABA Handbook references three of many possibilities for such termination: a
letter declaring the contract to be over, a refusal to pass along supplies, or a franchisee
closing its doors. Id.
150. If a franchisor was responsible for sending all supplies to the franchisee, and the
franchisor cuts that supply chain (or even drastically reduces the flow), the franchisee could
very well fail without any express declaration. Id. Another example could be a franchisor
infringing on what is supposed to be exclusive selling territory. Id.
151. W. Michael Garner, Fraud, Breach and Wrongful Termination, BLUE MAUMAU
(Dec.
13,
2010,
4:49
PM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/fraud_breach_and_wrongful_termination,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/7HQP-Y3Y3
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Mac’s Shell Court tried to advance the notion that franchisees need not go
out of business to receive relief, pointing to the possibility of injunctive
relief where a court could enjoin the franchisor from taking certain
actions.152 Indeed, in terms of state franchise law, “most franchise statutes
provide for both an award of damages and injunctive relief.”153 Still, in
spite of Chief Justice Roberts’s confidence that franchisees have remedial
flexibility,154 leading long-time franchise attorney and former International
Franchise Association general counsel Philip F. Zeidman cautions that
“court[s] may require a terminated franchisee to elect one or the other
remedy [a damages award or a permanent injunction] prior to trial.”155
Moreover, in oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts noted that some
decisions by franchisors could lead to franchisees “los[ing] the right to
operate.”156
Franchisees have lost a number of the reported cases in which they
sought to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) that prevented the
franchisor from terminating their agreement.157 Even if it is possible for the
152. Franchisees are permitted to seek injunctive relief as soon as the franchisee
receives “notice of impending termination.” Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 189; see also PMPA,
§2802(a) (stating that franchisors may not terminate a franchise before the end of the term).
However, the government, which was not a party to the case, read the PMPA slightly
differently and argued in its amicus brief for an interpretation of the PMPA that would allow
injunctive relief upon a franchisor’s announcement of “intent to engage in conduct that
would leave the franchisee no reasonable alternative but to abandon” any franchise element.
Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 189 n.9.
153. Philip F. Zeidman, Legal Aspects of Selling and Buying § 9:74 at 802 (3d ed.
2014).
154. See Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 189 (noting that a franchisee may request a
preliminary injunction after receiving notice of impending termination from the franchisor).
155. Zeidman, supra note 153, at 802 n.6 (citing Lakefield Tel. Co. v. N. Telecom, Inc.,
679 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1988), in which the court required a franchisee suing under the
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to choose between seeking the equitable remedy of an
injunction versus a damages award). Zeidman comments, “Otherwise, the court reasoned,
the franchisor would be placed in the position of arguing both the adequacy of monetary
damages (to defeat the injunction) and the lack of compensable injury (to defeat a future
damages claim).” Zeidman, supra note 153, at 802 n.6.
156. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. 175 (2010) (Nos. 08-240,
08-372). Justice Ginsburg seemed to recognize this point at as well, raising the notion that
franchisors can essentially make unilateral changes to the franchise agreement. Id. at 12.
157. Courts have found no likelihood of franchisee success on the merits of their
challenges to a termination, and thus denied a TRO for terminated dealers or franchisees.
See J.P.T. Auto., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 350 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (finding no grounds for TRO because the auto dealership agreement provided for
immediate termination if a dealer became insolvent, the dealer lost its floor plan financing,
the dealer’s liabilities significantly outweighed its assets, the dealer could not pay any of its
outstanding debts, the dealer had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection, or the dealer
had engaged in dishonest acts towards its customers); Frank Martin Sons, Inc. v. John Deere
Const. & Forestry Co., 542 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Me. 2008) (claiming that the franchisor had
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franchisees to win a TRO,158 injunctive relief will not work for all
franchisees, especially when the franchisor’s actions have effects that
cannot be undone. That is, once the franchisee has been compelled to stop
running a franchise (which involves using the trademark, operating at an
established location, etc.), the franchisee cannot easily resume operations
and pick up where it left off. This is the case even were the franchisee
successfully obtains a court order that enjoins, thereby theoretically undoes,
a franchisor’s actions that terminated the franchise.
Not only do franchise contracts often require arbitration,159 but it is
common practice for the franchisor, in drafting the franchise agreement,160

not terminated similarly situated franchisees for discrepancies related to warranty service,
finding that the Maine Franchise Act permitted termination for due cause without showing
other franchises were terminated on terms then equally available to all franchisees); Am.
Standard, Inc. v. Meehan, 517 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (denying the franchisee’s
claims that the parties orally modified a termination clause from allowing either party to
terminate on 30 days notice to one permitting termination only for cause and that the
franchisor was equitably estopped from terminating the contract without cause based on the
franchisor representative’s statements about its termination policy). Likewise, in Huang v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., although termination would likely cause hotel franchisees to lose their
business, there was no probable finding of arbitrary and capricious termination because the
franchisees had been told many times that their hotel did not meet franchise standards and,
despite receiving notice of deficiencies, franchisees consistently failed to maintain
acceptable quality standards. 594 F. Supp. 352 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
158. Two cases in which courts issued a TRO against a franchisor were Grosso
Enterprises, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, Civil Action No. 11-1484, 2011 WL 816620 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 9, 2011) and Progressive Restaurant Systems, Inc. v. Wendy’s International, Inc.,
No. 90-CV-791, 1990 WL 106719 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 1990). In Grosso Enterprises, the
court considered whether (1) the franchisee would suffer irreparable harm if the TRO were
denied and (2) the harm to the franchisee without a TRO outweighed the harm to the
franchisor if there were a TRO. 2011 WL 816620 at *5. The court noted that, having spent
his entire adult life operating a Domino’s franchise through Grosso Enterprises, the
franchisee would suffer more than just monetary harm if he lost a 14-year franchise. Id. at
*6. By contrast, if Grosso Enterprises continued to operate a franchise until the court ruled
on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, Domino’s harm would be de minimis. Id. The Court
thus concluded that the factors for granting a TRO weighed in the franchisee’s favor. Id.
Likewise, in Progressive Restaurants, the court granted a TRO on the ground that
termination of Wendy’s franchise rights would result in an immediate and irreparable loss to
the franchisees by forcing them into bankruptcy and leading to the loss of their businesses.
1990 WL 106719, at *2. While relying on the franchisor’s representations, the franchisees
spent thousands of dollars renovating the buildings leased and mortgaged from third parties
in order to operate Wendy’s franchises. Id. The court found that the balance of hardships
tipped toward the franchisees, as the franchisor would be unable to show any prejudice or
undue hardship if the franchise agreements continued pending the outcome of the litigation.
Id.
159. See Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Part Standard, supra note
1, at 695 (describing a survey of 100 franchise agreements in 2013, which found that 70% of
them had an arbitration clause).
160. The franchisor’s position, in drafting the terms of the franchise agreement, is in fact
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to ensure that arbitration, rather than litigation, does not undermine “the
franchisor’s ability to get a temporary restraining order when necessary to
protect the franchise system.”161 This is because most franchise agreements
have come to have an “injunctive relief provision” with words to the effect
that “[n]otwithstanding anything in [the arbitration clause] to the contrary,
Franchisor may bring an action for injunctive relief in any court having
jurisdiction to enforce the Franchisor’s noncompetition, trademark, and/or
proprietary rights, in order to avoid irreparable harm to the Franchisor, its
Affiliates, or the Franchise System as a whole.”162
Returning to Mac’s Shell, the court’s holding therefore seems to be
both an inadequate reading of the law and a flawed understanding of the
facts of franchising. The Court, in effect, does not deny that franchisees
may face unfair treatment, but it still overlooks or even outright rejects any
remedies for the franchisee when faced with this treatment.
B. Where Mac’s Shell Went Astray
The Court’s analogies seem to be off-point. First, the Court compares
the franchisor-franchisee relationship to employment law and constructive
discharges.163 The constructive discharge doctrine grew out of courts’ need
for a way to protect workers who have been forced out of their jobs but
were not actually fired.164 The standard for constructive discharge claims is
whether “a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign” based
on the working conditions.165 A claim of constructive discharge carries a
heavy burden of proof.166 In fact, the genesis of the constructive
just one of the factors often giving the franchisor a remarkable advantage over its
franchisees. Emerson, Assessing Awuah, supra note 145, at 208 n.22 (offering much
commentary and case law for the contention that franchisors control the process of making
the contract and that “franchisees usually do not—and perhaps cannot—bargain at arm’s
length when buying into a franchise agreement.”).
161. Timothy J. Bryant & Matthew E. Lane, Companion Dispute Resolution: ThreeDimensional Thinking and the Effective Use of Mediation with Traditional Litigation of
Franchise Disputes, 33 Franchise L.J. 261, 271 (2013).
162. Id. at 271-72 (quoting the model clause as an example of how an injunctive relief
provision is phrased).
163. Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 184.
164. 33 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 235 § 1 (1995).
165. Id. Courts have admitted there is no “mathematically precise test” for what is
intolerable. Bragg v. Office of the Dist. Atty., Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 704 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1059 (D. Colo. 2009) (quoting Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 714, 723
(D. Colo. 1995)). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances in their analysis. Bragg,
704 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
166. 33 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 235 § 1. This article does not suggest that these
claims are easy but, rather, that the remedy should still be available to those who need it.
The standard for finding a constructive termination, similar to constructive discharge,
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termination doctrine was intended to ease the concern of employees
considering staying in jobs with poor working conditions but hoping to be
fired so that they might sue for wrongful termination. The doctrine fights
the waste, the lies, and the dysfunction associated with having employees
who are already out the door psychologically but nonetheless engage in
pretense and remain – at least ostensibly – on the job, waiting to be fired.
Without constructive termination, this sham may be necessary because an
“honest” resignation would leave the employee without any remedy at
all.167
There is a stark contrast between the similar-sounding concepts of
constructive discharge and constructive termination. The constructive
discharge doctrine grew from a desire to give people the power to leave
their jobs without losing all remedies to address their employer’s
behavior.168 Constructive termination, however, is designed to allow
franchisees to pursue claims without “leaving the job.”169 In a sense, these
two doctrines are opposite in nature; one protects legal recourse once the
should be high, but far from unattainable.
167. Id.
168. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 n.8 (2004) (“[A]
prevailing constructive discharge plaintiff is entitled to all damages available for formal
discharge. The plaintiff may recover postresignation damages, including both backpay and,
in fitting circumstances, frontpay.”).
169. An employee subject to terms constituting a constructive termination may continue to
work under protest while he looks for a new job. Jones v F Sirl & Son (Furnishers Ltd.)
[1997] EAT 49 (Eng.), much as a franchisee ought to be able to explore his options while
voicing his discontent to the franchisor and – at least temporarily – maintaining the
franchise operations. In U.S. law, there are a number of cases analyzing the length of time
an employee stays on a job after the employee was allegedly constructively terminated. In
practice that time period may be considerable. See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876
P.2d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 1994) (while not finding constructive termination on the facts of that
case, noting that “an ‘outer limit’ beyond which an employee cannot remain on the job after
intolerable conditions arise and still claim constructive discharge” can be beyond a statute of
limitations period - “The length of time the plaintiff remained on the job may be one
relevant factor in determining the intolerability of employment conditions from the
standpoint of a reasonable person. Neither logic nor precedent suggests it should always be
dispositive.”). In.Mullins v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 936 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Cal. 1997), the
California Supreme Court articulated why constructive discharge law must not punish
parties for engaging in engaging in objectively reasonable behavior, such as trying to
resolve matters amicably:
As a practical matter, a rule requiring a lawsuit to be filed as soon as
intolerable conditions begin would interfere with informal
conciliation in the workplace. The filing of a lawsuit not only would
stifle the parties' efforts to resolve differences informally; it would
in most cases prompt the employee to resign at the earliest date to
avoid the awkwardness of maintaining employment while pursuing
litigation against his or her employer.
Id. at 1251. This reasoning for employment contracts applies to franchise contracts as well.
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offensive situation ends and the other guarantees legal recourse without
having to leave the situation. While the Court may appear to have a
persuasive comparison on the surface, these simply are not parallel fields.
The differences become even more apparent when comparing the setup of
these doctrines in the United States to the setup in France, where
constructive termination is applied more similarly to an employment
discharge, in reclassifying the franchise relationship as an employment
context. Indeed, in many circumstances, it is far easier to find another job
than to start anew after abandoning a franchise (and likely absorbing a
large monetary loss in the process).170
As stated above, there are many financial costs incurred by the
franchisee in establishing itself in a franchise system. The franchisee must
make a lump sum payment to acquire the right to use the trademark or
franchise goodwill in addition to the costs in starting up a new
establishment. These costs might include hiring and training costs,
purchasing supplies and goods, renovations, among others. The resources
involved in obtaining a new job, such as minor interview expenses and
time, are incomparable to the massive expenditures necessary in beginning
a new franchise relationship. With the lost capital from the terminated or
unsuccessful franchise relationship, the franchisee may find itself in a
vicious and unforgiving cycle of contributing large amounts of resources
with little return or guarantee of success.
Second, the Supreme Court draws parallels to landlord-tenant law and
constructive eviction.171 Here, again, the Court fails to step back and look
at the entire landscape. While the Court’s descriptions of the doctrine of
constructive eviction are correct,172 a tenant must leave the property before
pursuing such a claim,173 the Court fails to acknowledge that a tenant has
other options. The tenant may bring an action for rent or rent abatement,
show reliance on their landlord’s promises as a justification for delaying
departure from the premises, or find a new place to live.174 A franchisee is
left with fewer alternatives and given fewer protections under the law than
a harmed tenant. There are extensive legislative structures at the federal
and state law levels devoted solely to tenant protection (for example, the
existence of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; fair

170. For discussion of the costs involved, see supra Part I. On sunk costs for
franchisees, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make It
Better, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 367-68 (2013).
171. Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 184.
172. See id. (noting that constructive eviction requires a tenant to “actually move out in
order to claim constructive eviction”).
173. DEF. AGAINST A PRIMA FACIE CASE § 7.4 (Thompson Reuters ed., rev ed.).
174. Id.
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housing laws and councils; and advocacy programs, such as tenants unions;
etc.). Additionally, landlords may violate the implied warranty of
habitability when they do not uphold their end of a leasehold agreement – a
finding that can be made irrespective of the tenant leaving the leased
premises – there is no comparable implied warranty in the franchising
context. While the legal doctrines have similarities, the matters at stake are
far greater for the franchisee than for the tenant.
In fact, the Court may have missed an opportunity to make a proper
analogy across legal doctrines. Contract law’s doctrine of anticipatory
breaches went seemingly unmentioned in briefs or in oral arguments
throughout the case.175 In this situation, a party having a present duty of
performance may violate a contract under the doctrine of breach by
anticipatory repudiation.176 Here, for example, a party’s words or actions
before a substantive breach occurs can constitute a refusal to perform at the
time they were made or done. For anticipatory breaches, the Court must
decide whether the non-violating party should continue in the contract
based off of the extent of the breach. This type of evaluation is comparable
to France’s treatment of franchise terminations, which also looks at
whether continuing in the relationship is possible and beneficial. Looking
to contract law concepts should help ease the Court’s fears177 about setting
a particular standard for constructive termination, as it will not be paving
new ground after all. This doctrine also allows the injured party to measure
damages,178 which a franchisee in a constructive termination situation is
likely in great need of, as evidenced by the vast losses described above.
Drawing from this doctrine would also be beneficial in providing recourse
for an injured party before the final and full injury has occurred.
Judges and commentators have voiced their concern over whether
constructive termination claims are better resolved through other causes of
action.179 The Supreme Court reasoned that the availability of state law
claims allows other avenues for franchisees to recover.180 The Court’s

175. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. 175 (2009) (Nos. 08-240,
08-372), 2009 WL 3391431 (failing to mention anticipatory repudiation); see also
Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. 175 (2009) (Nos. 08-240, 08-372),
2009 WL 462411 (failing to mention anticipatory repudiation).
176. See generally 22 STEVEN W. FELDMAN, TENNESSEE PRACTICE: CONTRACT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 11:16 (2006) (explaining the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation).
177. Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 176.
178. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-713 (describing the computation of a buyer’s damages for
repudiation by the seller).
179. See Robert K. Kry, Mac’s Shell and the Future of Constructive Termination, 30
FRANCHISE L.J. 67, 70 (2010) (suggesting that constructive termination is a workable
standard even when the franchisee continues to operate).
180. See Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 188 (describing that a jury verdict in favor of the
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analysis accepted Shell Oil’s argument that federal constructive termination
claims were, to be expressed colloquially, “piling on.”181 Thus, the Court
reasoned that breach of contract claims might provide a reasonable enough
avenue of recourse for franchisees.182 However, both Justices Roberts and
Stevens pointed out that contract law and constructive termination need not
be mutually exclusive.183 The goal of the United States’ legal system is not
to limit an injured party to just one cause of action or method of obtaining
redress. While laws must be narrowly tailored enough to target specific
behaviors, they cannot serve as a netting function to prohibit legitimate
lawsuits. Furthermore, a strong counterpoint to the “piling on” argument of
Shell Oil’s attorney would be Congress’ own expression that the PMPA’s
statutory language does not limit judicial discretion to provide effective,
equitable relief.184
Mac’s Shell simply may not have been the best test case for
constructive termination proponents.185 Those franchisees that sued on
non-renewal claims, despite later agreeing to renewal contracts, bolstered
Shell’s argument against recognizing constructive termination claims.186
Also, the Mac’s Shell attorney faced extensive questioning by the Justices
with few strong answers187; perhaps at least one judicial ally on the high
court, if not at the oral argument then at least in the opinion itself, would
have ensured, if not a different holding, at least a more sound opinion – one
that addressed all relevant issues and perhaps even considered the opinion’s
tone with respect to a fractured industry (gasoline dealerships) and a
structurally compromised business model (franchising itself).

dealers’ state law claims demonstrated meaningful protection).
181. See Brief for Respondent at 12, Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. 175 (2009) (Nos. 08-240,
08-372) (“[T]he government’s proposed [constructive termination] standard . . . would
exponentially expand liability.”).
182. See Mac’s Shell, 559 U.S. at 182, 188 (finding that a necessary element of
constructive termination is a franchisor’s effectively forcing an end to the relationship; but
franchisees can usually rely on state-law remedies).
183. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at *17 (statement of Chief
Justice Roberts) (suggesting that a franchisor’s actions may give rise to both breach of
contract and constructive termination claims); id. at *55 (statement of Justice Stevens)
(pointing out that contract law’s insufficient nature led to Congress’ decision to enact the
PMPA); but see id. (statement of Shell Oil attorney) (countering that the PMPA only steps
in on narrow grounds).
184. See, 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b), supra note 15, and accompanying text (providing that
Congress left at least some presence of judicial discretion in related decisions).
185. 559 U.S. 175.
186. Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 181, at 10.
187. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at *34 (statement by
Justice Kennedy) (reflecting incredulity at Mac’s Shell attorney’s failure to suggest a test for
constructive termination to the Justices).
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C. American Case Law in Favor of Constructive Termination; Other
Policy Grounds for a Counterweight to the Mac’s Shell Holding
Existing case law shows the suitability of constructive termination in
the franchising context. In fact, there is much judicial authority backing
such claims. The First Circuit’s opinion in Mac’s Shell, although certainly
not binding authority,188 has reasoning that remains accessible to future
litigants for persuasive arguments. The First Circuit held that the claim of
constructive non-renewal of the lease under PMPA was not available for
the franchisees because of the fact that they signed a lease renewal, instead
of ruling out the claim of constructive termination as a whole for franchise
relationships under the PMPA.189 The Court’s holding was based on the
policy concerns that allowing a party to “sign [a] contract and
simultaneously challenge it” was contrary to the goals of the PMPA.190 An
annulment of this behavior would also be violative of freedom of contract
principles. Indeed, one could say that the Circuit Court’s analysis was
stronger than the facts of the case perhaps merited, while the Supreme
Court’s reasoning was the opposite: weaker and with gaps in its
consideration of the constructive termination doctrine because of (1) the
factual peculiarities of the Mac’s Shell case, and (2) the absence of a
dissenting opinion that may have compelled the high court to consider all
the ramifications of its holding. Based on the First Circuit’s analysis of the
applicability of constructive termination when the franchisee has signed a
renewal agreement, it seems unnecessary for the Court to have analyzed the
applicability of the doctrine as a whole against the spectrum of PMPA
cases. The Court, instead, should have limited its analysis to whether the
lower court’s holding that constructive termination could not apply to a
signed renewal agreement was erroneous under the proper standard of
review.
The First Circuit is not alone in deciding this issue far differently than
the Supreme Court did in Mac’s Shell. Four other circuits – the Second,
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth – also sided with franchisees on the Mac’s Shell
issues and similar termination controversies.191 In Petereit v. S.B. Thomas,
188. It was overturned, after all.
189. Marcoux, supra note 30.
190. Id.
191. See American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192, 198-200 (10th Cir.
1967) (ruling in favor of dealer when manufacturer refused to honor warranty arrangements
of franchise agreement and to supply automobiles); Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 795 F.2d 358,
362-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding against franchisor oil company that sold interest in franchise
to third party and leased premises to third party, even if authorized by state law); Pro Sales,
Inc. v. Texaco, U.S.A., 792 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding for franchisee who
invoked rights under PMPA and only signed successor contract under protest); Petereit v.
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Inc., the Second Circuit found that “total abrogation” was not needed for a
franchise to be effectively terminated.192 While that court also cautioned
that not every negative impact would be considered a constructive
termination,193 it put forth the very argument supported in this article:
requiring abandonment would deal a near-fatal blow to the doctrine of
constructive termination.194 The Second Circuit even went so far as to offer
some guidance on constructive termination analysis: “A franchisor may
take action that results in less than the complete destruction of a
franchisee’s business, but yet [sic] so greatly reduces the value of the
franchise as to epitomize the very abuse of disparity in economic power
that the Act seeks to prevent.”195
In Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp., the Fourth Circuit cited directly from the
PMPA’s legislative history while finding that part of the reasoning for
PMPA’s passing stemmed from franchisors coercing franchisees to comply
with their marketing policies.196 The Fourth Circuit held that assignment of
a franchise that increases the retailer’s cost of gasoline to higher than the
franchisor’s stipulated price gives rise to a cause of action.197 Similarly, in
Pro Sales, Inc. v. Texaco, U.S.A., the Ninth Circuit looked to the PMPA’s
legislative history when deciding in a franchisee’s favor.198 The Ninth
Circuit went even further, however, by allowing a cause of action when a
renewal contract was signed under protest.199 Finally, in American Motors

S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1181-83 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding for franchisee after
alteration of his sales territory).
192. Petereit, 63 F.3d at 1181-82.
193. Id. at 1182. There must be “something greater than a de minimis loss of revenue.”
Id. at 1183. But a franchisor does not have to send a franchisee to “near-destruction.” Id. at
1182.
194. Id. (concluding that “[i]f the protections the Connecticut legislature afforded to
franchisees were brought into play only by a formal termination, those protections would
quickly become illusory.”).
195. Id.
196. Barnes, 795 F.2d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1986).
197. Id. at 359.
198. Pro Sales, 792 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding “that this
congressional plan would be frustrated by requiring a franchisee to go out of business before
invoking the protections of the PMPA.”).
199. Id. at 1396. Texaco had threatened non-renewal if Pro Sales did not agree to a fouryear agreement reducing the volume of gasoline Pro Sales could buy. Id. Only after Texaco
sent notice of non-renewal did Pro Sales sign the new agreement, and it did so under protest.
Id. The signing of renewal agreements was, in retrospect, an error, perhaps the fatal mistake
of the dealers in Mac’s Shell. Even in the more franchisee-friendly law of France, the Mac’s
Shell holding on renewal is the easy answer, absent strong indications of bad faith, to the
question: “Can a franchisee renew the franchise relationship, despite strong dissatisfaction
and even a loud protest while signing the renewal form, and then proceed on a claim of
constructive termination?”
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Sales Corp. v. Semke, the Tenth Circuit made an analogy to good faith
dealing.200 The court stated that a franchisor could not pressure a
franchisee to take supplies the franchisee did not want or could not use.201
The Tenth Circuit found it reasonable to interpret the Act as allowing a
cause of action based on coercive or intimidating acts.202
All of these holdings present a glimmer of light as to future franchise
termination jurisprudence. Likewise, the French law shows that – even
without a direct reversal of the constructive termination in Mac’s Shell –
American courts can construct a more equitable and efficient legal
environment for franchised businesses.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court’s decision in Mac’s Shell to disallow constructive
termination inappropriately withdrew a major franchisee protection.
Effectively, franchisees have no recourse under the PMPA for constructive
termination unless the franchisor has abandoned the franchise system
entirely. There are many doctrines within the American legal system that
deal with the concept of “constructively” implying an action, such as
constructive eviction, constructive notice, and constructive discharge. The
idea behind these doctrines is to impute the action upon an individual
without requiring the full showing for the actual action. Requiring actual
abandonment before allowing a claim of constructive termination violates
the entire policy behind the doctrine of constructive termination if actual
termination is the real standard.
The requirement of abandonment before constructive termination is
out of touch with the concept of constructive termination and fails to
consider the associated economic penalties. The event of an actual
Under French case law, the franchisee has no right to renew the franchise contract when the
contract does indicate a term. (Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
com., May 23, 2000, Bull. civ. IV; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] com., June 6, 2001, Bull. civ. IV, No. 99-20831. Nevertheless, if the franchisee
continues to perform its obligations after the contract’s termination, an agreement without
term is concluded between the parties (“tacite reconduction”). Under the general theory of
obligations law, the French Civil Code provides that, when signing an agreement, a party
that was acting with consent fully undertakes to perform the contract, according to the
doctrine of individual autonomy. See EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 299 (2010) (concluding, “At the heart of French contract law lies the central
doctrine of autonomie de la volonté”).
200. American Motors, 384 F.2d at 195 (10th Cir. 1967).
201. Id.
202. Id. (holding that “[i]f coercion or intimidation does compel the dealer to terminate
his franchise then clearly ‘it relates’ to the termination and would thus appear to be
actionable by the dealer.”).
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termination of a franchise relationship, as required in Mac’s Shell, can be
the “nail in the coffin” for franchisees. The franchisee’s investments into
the enterprise, facility improvements, and training will be lost, and often,
irrecoverable and nontransferable. Additionally, the franchisee may be left
without capital to pursue other business opportunities. The dependency of
the American economy upon franchising makes it clear that the Mac’s Shell
decision should not be extended to other, non-PMPA franchises or to the
PMPA franchises similar to Mac’s Shell.
The United States does not have many of the other pro-franchisee
aspects that French law possesses, such as savoir-faire,203 territorial
protections,204 goodwill,205 and indemnity,206 among others.
Thus,
constructive termination might not be as necessary a concept in France as
in the United States, where pro-franchisor written agreements dominate the
franchising arena. A decision such as Mac’s Shell therefore requires other
considerations for franchisees in order to maintain hospitable conditions for
their dealing with franchisors. American policymakers should learn from
the French legal system, which, while in one respect fosters a hostile
environment for franchisees through its treatment of constructive
termination, has remedied that with other considerations not available in
the United States that serve as contractual and judicial protections of
franchisees. The French legal system has established mechanisms such that
the judiciary has the ability to monitor the franchise system and
terminations, as well as other types of contractual relationships and
breaches.
The Mac’s Shell requirement of abandonment strips away any judicial
power to find a termination of a PMPA-governed system based on a
franchisor’s actions. Thus, no matter what actions a franchisor takes
against its franchisee, courts very likely cannot intervene to uphold the
franchisee’s rights. While the French case law related to franchise
termination may not fit directly into the American legal system, the profranchisee morale and mentality may be an easier fit. With the economic
benefits franchise systems bring to the U.S. economy, it is important to
encourage the franchisees that make these enterprises possible to continue
in their efforts. Allowing franchisees to seek recourse through the avenue
of a constructive termination claim is one method towards reaching this
goal.

203. Emerson, supra note 137.
204. Emerson, A French Comparison, supra note 22.
205. Emerson, supra note 170.
206. DIDIER FERRIER & NICOLAS FERRIER, DROIT DE LA DISTRIBUTION 64-65, 91, 115-17
(7th ed. 2014).

